entry~1 min readUpdated 2026-07-18#orientation#invariants#threat-modeling

Must Know

  • A blockchain is a replicated state machine whose history can have temporary competing views. “Included,” “confirmed,” “safe,” and “finalized” are different claims.
  • A transaction is an adversarial input. Its sender, ordering, gas, callbacks, tokens, external data, and surrounding transactions may all be hostile.
  • Contract state is public; signatures authorize messages but do not make their contents secret.
  • Code correctness is not economic safety. A mathematically correct transition can encode a manipulable oracle, insolvent market, captured governance process, or unusable recovery path.
  • Every privileged key and upgrade route belongs in the protocol threat model.
  • Logs are not contract storage. Indexes and dashboards are derived views that must survive reorgs, backfills, duplicate delivery, and dishonest RPC responses.
  • Standards specify interfaces and behavior, not universal token safety or implementation quality.
  • Cross-chain messages inherit multiple consensus, finality, relayer, bridge, admin, and recovery assumptions.
  • “Audited,” “formally verified,” “decentralized,” and “production-ready” require scoped evidence.
  • Tests can prove the presence of checked behavior, not the absence of every bug. State assumptions explicitly.

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