Inspect File Upload Surface Goal Determine whether upload features create unsafe execution, storage, parser, or exposure paths. Assumptions uploads may be validated weakly post-processing is often riskier than the upload itself storage and serving paths may cross trust boundaries Prerequisites one or more upload or import features ability to inspect storage, response behavior, or processing side effects where authorized Recon steps Map all upload and import entry points. Identify where files are stored, transformed, previewed, or served. Note allowed extensions, MIME handling, naming, and public exposure. Exploit / test steps Compare extension checks vs actual parser behavior. Test whether uploaded content is served back from executable or overly trusted contexts. Probe archive and document processing paths. Inspect filename handling and path assumptions. Look for predictable public URLs or indirect exposure of stored files. Validation clues unsafe file types accepted or mishandled uploaded content becomes publicly reachable unexpectedly processing path reveals parser or storage issues files can influence downstream rendering or server behavior Mitigation validate more than extension alone isolate storage and serving paths avoid execution-capable contexts review previews/transforms as part of the attack surface use indirect references and safe naming Logging / detection unusual upload MIME/type combinations repeated failed processing attempts public access to files that should remain private Related notes file-upload-abuse path-traversal xss exposed-storage References Testing / Lab: PortSwigger file upload vulnerabilities — https://portswigger.net/web-security/file-upload Foundational: OWASP WSTG — https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/ ← PreviousExploit SQL InjectionNext →Inspect Session Handling Explore nearby notes Security PlaybooksBreak JWT ValidationIdentify whether JWT handling is weak enough to allow acceptance of invalid, stale, mis-scoped, or attacker-influenced tokens. Security PlaybooksDetect DCSync and ntds.dit AccessDetect both forms of bulk Active Directory credential extraction — **DCSync** (IDL_DRSGetNCChanges via the DRSUAPI RPC interface) and **offline ntds.dit... Security PlaybooksDetect External Recon Scan PipelineDetect an external operator running a two-phase Masscan → Nmap-NSE recon pipeline (the offense playbook run-scan-pipeline) against your perimeter, with high enough... Security PlaybooksDetect Kerberoasting and AS-REP RoastingDetect both Active Directory Kerberos credential-attack families (Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting) via behavioral analysis on Event IDs 4768/4769 and... Security PlaybooksExploit IDORDetermine whether object identifiers can be manipulated to access another user's data or actions. Security PlaybooksExploit SQL InjectionDetermine whether user-controlled input can alter SQL query logic in a way that changes access, data, or behavior.